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The Facts
The dispute concerned the Parliamentary election in the Petauke 
constituency in the Eastern Province of Zambia. The Petitioner was 
seeking an order by the Constitutional court compelling the Electoral 
Commission of Zambia (“ECZ”) to cancel the Parliamentary elections 
in Petauke Central constituency and call for fresh nominations. 
According to Article 52(6) of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) 
Act, elections must be cancelled when a candidate withdraws, dies or is 
disqualified before the election date. The Petitioner based his claim on the 
alleged withdrawal of one of the candidates for the Parliamentary seat, Mr. 
Josab Changa. The Petitioner relied on newspaper articles and media reports 
that alluded to the fact that Mr. Changa had withdrawn his candidacy for 
the Petauke Central Parliamentary seat. The Petitioner alleged that Mr. 
Changa’s failure to clarify the media reports when asked to do so by ECZ 
was evidence that he had withdrawn from the election, and therefore the 
election had to be cancelled and fresh nominations called for. 
In response, the Electoral Commission of Zambia averred that it was 
a public body established to serve the interest of the people of Zambia 
and could not, when discharging its functions, be driven by rumors. The 
ECZ further averred that after calling Mr. Changa to a meeting and 
asking him to submit a formal withdrawal of his candidature, he failed to 
do so. As a result of not receiving official notification of his withdrawal as 
a candidate, the commission argued that they had no reasonable cause to 




Substantively, the legal issue to be determined by the court was this; what 
constitutes withdrawal of candidature for an election to the National 
Assembly? 
The Holding
The court held that since a Petitioner who alleges a fact must prove it 
to the required standard, the fact that the Petitioner did not provide 
documentary proof (besides media reports), meant that the evidentiary 
burden was not discharged. The failure of the Petitioner to cite Mr. 
Changa as a respondent was also detrimental to this case, as he could 
not definitively state if he had actually withdrawn his candidature. 
The court was emphatic that a withdrawal of candidature must be formal, 
that is, expressed in writing to the Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
The court held that in the same manner one formally files nomination 
papers to run for a Parliamentary seat, one must also formally write to 
the commission when withdrawing from an election. Notably, the court 
refused to take judicial notice of newspaper reports of Mr. Changa’s 
alleged withdrawal. 
Because no formal communication or letter of withdrawal was received, 
the court held that ECZ had no legal basis on which to cancel elections 
and call for fresh nominations and that consequently; Article 52(6) was 
not breached.
The Significance
The case raises interesting questions about judicial notice. The Shamwana1 
case is probably the leading case on judicial notice in Zambia. It held that 
a court may take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge 
and in doing so may refer to its own record.2 In the well-known British 
1  The People v Edward Jack Shamwana and 12 others (1982) Z.R. 122 (HC)
2  Ibid at page 11.
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case of Commonwealth Shipping v Peninsular Branch Service,3 the 
court held that judicial notice shall be taken from facts which are of 
“general knowledge” or from “inquiries to be made by himself for his 
own information from sources to which it is proper to refer”.4 Whether or 
not taking judicial notice of the facts as reported by a newspaper article 
would be “proper to refer” was a question that the court did not directly 
engage in. As was accepted in Shamwana, it would be pedantic and futile 
for a court to insist on further proof when the facts presented before the 
court are that which everyone is fully aware of. 5
However the conservative approach taken to judicial notice of newspaper 
articles by the court cannot be assailed, considering the fact that it may not 
always be possible for a court to verify the authenticity of media reports. 
Unverified media reports can be erroneous and even malicious, and it 
would thus be a grave injustice for a court to permanently alter the rights 
of a party based on conjecture. However judicial notice of facts contained 
in newspaper articles have been given effect in other jurisdictions.6 It 
would therefore have been useful for the court to consider comparative 
jurisprudential developments of the doctrine of judicial notice and engage 
with the principles established in the Shamwana case. The Shamwana 
court did hint at the fact that courts may take judicial notice of facts 
contained in newspaper articles provided that those facts are supported 
by another form of proof.7 This was the perfect opportunity for the highest 
court to extrapolate this matter and establish the circumstances under 
which media reports can be relied upon, if any. 
The court went on to hold that formal withdrawal of candidacy is required 
in the same way that formal notification of a nomination is required. It is 
3  (1923) A.C. (House of Lords) 1922.
4  Commonwealth Shipping (n3) at p. 212.
5  Also confirmed in The People v. Fred M’membe and others 1996//HP/38
6  See The Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291-92 [D.C. Cir. 1991]]
7  Shamwana (n3) at page 12.
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interesting that the court did not make reference to section 31(2) of the 
Electoral Process Act,8 which requires written notice for the withdrawal 
of nomination for an election in any constituency. The requirement of 
formal written notice is clear, and it was the intention of the legislature 
(and the court in this instance) to insist on formal withdrawal to ensure 
certainty. It is rather strange that the Court did not make reference to 
the Electoral Process Act since Article 52 (6) of the Constitution cannot 
be viewed in isolation from that Act. Fortunately, despite not referring to 
the Act which regulates the process for elections in Zambia, they upheld 
the requirement for formal, written notice of withdrawal. 
It therefore follows that even if judicial notice was taken of the newspaper 
article, and that article had been allowed to inform the decision to invoke 
Article 52(6) and call for fresh nominations, such a decision would have 
been contrary to the Electoral Process Act which requires formal written 
notice of withdrawal. 
The implication of this Constitutional court decision is that formal 
withdrawal is necessary. Not only would this be in line with the pre-
existing law in the Electoral Act, it also ensures that the candidacy process 
is formal at both the nomination and withdrawal stage rather than having 
separate processes which could cause confusion and uncertainty in the 
administration of elections. 
The court commented on the failure of the Applicants to cite Mr. 
Changa as a party to these proceedings. Election petition cases cite 
both the Electoral Commission of Zambia and the winning candidate 
as respondents9 to afford that candidate an opportunity to make 
representations. It must be noted that citing of the winning or relevant 
8  No. 35 of 2016 (repealed the Electoral Act No. 12 of 2006).
9  See for example: Vincent Mwale v Eustarckio Kazonga and ECZ 2011/HP/





candidate in petition proceedings is implicitly required by the Electoral 
Process Act.10 However there is no such requirement for disputes relating 
to the withdrawal of a candidate. It would follow however that citing 
Mr. Changa as a respondent was necessary to allow the court to take 
his representations into consideration. This practice should apply to all 
such disputes to ensure the relevant candidate can make representations, 
in the same way Election petition matters usually proceed. The failure 
to cite Mr. Changa as a respondent was a glaring omission on the part 
of the applicants. Had he been cited, he would have had to declare the 
status of his candidature before the court. 
This Constitutional court decision established that formal withdrawal of 
candidature is necessary. However in its reasoning, reference should have 
been made to section 31(2) of the Electoral Act which explicitly states 
that formal withdrawal of candidacy is necessary. This would complement 
the enquiry as to when Article 52(6) of the Constitution can be invoked. 
Additionally, it would have allowed the court to entirely sidestep the 
question of judicial notice and promptly dispose of the question at hand. 
10  See definition of “respondent” in the Act.
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